University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

2018

Infamous Misdemeanors and the Grand Jury
Clause
Gabriel J. Chin
John Ormonde

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Chin, Gabriel J. and Ormonde, John, "Infamous Misdemeanors and the Grand Jury Clause" (2018). Minnesota Law Review. 121.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/121

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Article

Infamous Misdemeanors and the Grand
Jury Clause
Gabriel J. Chin † & John Ormonde ††
INTRODUCTION
Under an overlooked body of constitutional law, many more
federal offenses should be prosecuted by grand jury indictment
than is now the practice. Under the current rules, 1 felonies must
be prosecuted by grand jury indictment, 2 but a misdemeanor
† Edward L. Barrett Jr. Chair & Martin Luther King Jr. Professor of Law,
University of California–Davis School of Law. Thanks to Ash Bhagwat, Beth
Colgan, Laura Conover, Ingrid Eagly, Alec Ewald, Ron Goldstock, Irene Joe,
Andy Kim, Margaret Colgate Love, David Porter, Robert Scherer, Ric Simmons,
Greg Stein, Juliet Stumpf, Aaron Tang, Suja Thomas, participants in workshops at the Southwest Criminal Scholarship Conference and the Program in
Criminal Law and Policy at the University of Arizona, Rogers College of Law,
and the faculties of UC Davis School of Law, Concordia University School of
Law, and the University of Tennessee College of Law.
†† Associate, Silverstein & Pomerantz LLP; J.D., University of California–
Davis School of Law. Copyright © 2018 by Gabriel J. Chin and John Ormonde.
1. Under federal law, a felony is a crime punishable by more than one year
imprisonment; crimes with lesser terms are misdemeanors. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3559(a) (2012). FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a) provides:
(1) Felony. An offense (other than criminal contempt) must be prosecuted by an indictment if it is punishable:
(A) by death; or
(B) by imprisonment for more than one year.
(2) Misdemeanor. An offense punishable by imprisonment for one year
or less may be prosecuted in accordance with Rule 58(b)(1).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 58(b)(1) provides: “ The trial of a misdemeanor may proceed on
an indictment, information, or complaint. The trial of a petty offense may also
proceed on a citation or violation notice.” See also United States v. Rojo,
727 F.2d 1415, 1416–17 (9th Cir. 1983) (“On the one hand, the trial of misdemeanors, other than petty offenses, may proceed on an indictment, information
or complaint. . . . On the other hand, the trial of a petty offense may proceed on
a citation or violation notice.”).
2. A grand jury indictment is a finding by a body of citizens appointed by
law that there is probable cause that a particular offense has been committed.
See Niki Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor: Explaining the Constitutional
Function of the Federal Grand Jury, 94 GEO. L.J. 1265, 1279 (2006); see also
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may be based on a charge in a prosecutor’s information 3 or even
a ticket issued by a law-enforcement officer with no further review. 4 The felony/misdemeanor bright line is not the distinction
drawn in the Fifth Amendment itself, which provides that “[n]o
person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand
jury.” 5 That is, infamous misdemeanors, if there are such things,
must also be charged by indictment. The Supreme Court has
held that particular misdemeanors are infamous, and under the
Court’s tests for infamy, many misdemeanors prosecutable in
federal court are infamous. 6
The issue is important because of the dramatic increase in
the number of Americans with criminal records,7 and the severity of the consequences of even misdemeanor convictions.8 It is
too easy for police and prosecutors to charge individuals with
crimes carrying serious consequences. As the Department of Justice’s investigation of practices in Ferguson, Missouri revealed, 9
misdemeanor charges can effectively turn individuals or entire
communities into forced laborers, which, after all, is permitted
under the Thirteenth Amendment after conviction of any
crime.10 Public and private actors use criminal records to deny a
Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956) (describing the English origins of the grand jury institution). The Supreme Court held long ago that the
Grand Jury Clause is not applicable to the states. See Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516, 521 (1884). Accordingly, states need not charge any crimes by indictment.
3. “An information is a formal charge against the accused, of the offence,
with such particulars as to time, place, and attendant circumstances as will apprise him of the nature of the charge he is to meet, signed by the public prosecutor.” In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 257 (1894).
4. See supra note 1.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. See infra notes 124–130 and accompanying text.
7. MADELINE NEIGHLY & MAURICE EMSELLEM, WANTED: ACCURATE FBI
BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 2 (2013), http://www.nelp.org/content/
uploads/2015/03/Report-Wanted-Accurate-FBI-Background-Checks
-Employment.pdf (noting that the FBI “maintains criminal history records on
more than 75 million individuals”).
8. See infra notes 42–47 and accompanying text.
9. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_
department_report.pdf.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”).
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range of benefits and opportunities. Even if a charge does not
lead to conviction, a person could be deported, evicted, have a
license suspended, or child custody disrupted, or suffer adverse
employment actions. 11
Lack of precharge screening by a grand jury has serious consequences for federal misdemeanors. Misdemeanors are much
more likely to be dismissed without trial than felonies; that is,
upon further examination, courts or prosecutors conclude that
many misdemeanors do not actually merit prosecution. 12 As a
result of the lack of precharge screening, thousands of people
every year who never should have been charged nevertheless
wind up with criminal records, albeit only for a misdemeanor
charge.13
Advocating increased use of grand juries may seem odd because the institution has been criticized in recent years for its
lack of transparency, particularly in cases involving shootings by
police officers. 14 Furthermore, the grand jury is often accused of

11. Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 809 (2015); see
also infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 70–78 and accompanying text.
13. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 15 (2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/usao/legacy/2014/09/22/13statrpt.pdf (providing statistics for misdemeanor
plea, dismissal, and conviction rates in 2013 in U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia).
14. See, e.g., Kristin Henning, Status, Race and the Rule of Law in the
Grand Jury, 58 HOW. L.J. 833, 843 (2015) (“Reform is essential not only because prosecutorial manipulation has helped exonerate police officers in the
killing of black and brown men, but also because the grand jury has been used
so unevenly across race, class, and professional status and has failed to provide
even the most basic due process protections for most criminal defendants who
are disproportionately people of color.”); Colin Taylor Ross, Policing Pontius Pilate: Police Violence, Local Prosecutors, and Legitimacy, 53 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 755, 761 (2016). See generally Blanche Bong Cook, Biased and Broken
Bodies of Proof: White Heteropatriarchy, the Grand Jury Process, and Performance on Unarmed Black Flesh, 85 UMKC L. REV. 567 (2017) (focusing specifically on the grand jury proceeding in the shooting death of Michael Brown);
Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The Grand Jury’s Role in the Prosecution of Unjustified
Police Killings—Challenges and Solutions, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 397
(2017) (arguing for prohibition of grand juries in police shooting cases); Ric Simmons, The Role of the Prosecutor and the Grand Jury in Police Use of Deadly
Force Cases: Restoring the Grand Jury to Its Original Purpose, 65 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 519 (2017) (comparing grand juries in three different police use of force
cases); Jonathan Witmer-Rich, Restoring Independence to the Grand Jury: A
Victim Advocate for Police Use of Force Cases, 65 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 535 (2017)
(arguing that victim advocates should represent the interests of the complainant before the grand jury in police violence cases).
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being under the control of the prosecutor.15 But these objections—or at least the remedy proposed to address them—apply
principally to state criminal-justice systems. In the states, there
is a potential alternative to a grand jury that is more public and
transparent. Felonies can be charged through a grand jury indictment or a preliminary hearing
which involves the prosecutor presenting evidence in an open courtroom proceeding in an effort to persuade a judge that probable cause
exists to hold a defendant over for trial. Unlike in the grand jury, preliminary hearings allow defense counsel to be present, cross-examine
government witnesses, and challenge the prosecution’s evidence. 16

In the federal system, charging serious crimes by a preliminary hearing or any other more accountable method would require a constitutional amendment to eliminate the grand jury
requirement, not mere adjustment of policy. 17 Accordingly, in
the federal system, the choice is not between grand juries and
preliminary hearings, but between grand juries and direct filing
of charges by prosecutors or police with no non-law-enforcement
review whatsoever. And consideration by a grand jury, imperfect
as it is, is more transparent and independent than the unilateral
decision of an individual prosecutor or law enforcement officer.
Part I of this Article explains that serious consequences may
fall on people convicted of federal misdemeanors. 18 These include
deportation, sex offender or other criminal registration, loss of
civil rights, and penalties flowing from the permanent change of
legal status caused by criminal conviction.19 Misdemeanor convictions and criminal records may also give rise to profound
stigma, resulting in exclusion from a variety of benefits and opportunities conferred by the government and private parties. 20
Part II outlines the jurisprudence of the Grand Jury Clause,
pursuant to which the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries rebuffed attempts by the Department
of Justice to prosecute serious misdemeanor offenses by information. 21 The principle coming out of the decisions, consistent
15. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
16. Fairfax, supra note 14, at 401–02.
17. Alternatively, federal prosecutors could be required both to present
cases to a grand jury and to have a preliminary hearing. Presumably the Department of Justice would strenuously object to this elaborate process, and Congress seems unlikely to require it.
18. See infra notes 36–47 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 121–134 and accompanying text.
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with the drafting history, is that offenses potentially resulting in
stigmatizing punishments must be prosecuted by grand jury indictment.22 A stigmatizing punishment is one that degrades the
offender’s status, indicating that the person is less than a full
member of the community. 23 Stigmatizing punishments include
corporal punishment, incarceration in a prison or penitentiary
as opposed to a jail, loss of civil rights or imposition of civil disabilities, and convictions implying moral turpitude. 24 The Supreme Court also made clear that what is infamous changes from
era to era, as the social meaning of stigma evolves. 25
The Court’s early cases hold that many misdemeanors
should be charged by grand jury indictment,26 but that is not the
practice today.27 Federal sentencing statutes now permit imprisonment for all misdemeanors, and permit any sentence of incarceration to be served in a prison. 28 That the U.S. Code allows
misdemeanor sentences to be served in prisons may well be a
drafting mistake, made in ignorance of the constitutional consequences; 29 if so, it could be easily corrected. But until then, all
federal misdemeanors should be prosecuted only by grand jury
indictment because all misdemeanors carry potential prison sentences. 30
Several other categories of misdemeanors require grand
jury indictment. All drug offenses may be punished by serious
collateral consequences, which include loss or restriction of professional licenses, ineligibility for public funds, including welfare
benefits and student loans, loss of voting rights, ineligibility for
jury duty, and deportation. 31 Misdemeanors involving moral turpitude or crimen falsi may be used for impeachment if the person

22. See infra notes 83–120 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 99–109 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 135–191 and accompanying text.
25. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 124–130 and accompanying text.
27. See supra note 1.
28. See infra notes 143–145 and accompanying text.
29. That is, we can assume that Congress did not intend to require all misdemeanors to be subject to grand jury indictment, because they did not so provide. See supra note 1. Yet, we cannot lightly assume that Congress deliberately
violated the Constitution by providing for infamous punishment in the absence
of grand jury indictment. Accordingly, a plausible, logical explanation is ignorance of this relatively obscure area of constitutional law.
30. See infra notes 135–152 and accompanying text.
31. See infra note 173 and accompanying text. For a more detailed discussion of drug offenses and collateral consequences, see Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the
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convicted testifies in court or to find the absence of good moral
character if the person seeks a professional license, such as to
practice law. 32 Many sex offenses classified as misdemeanors require registration.33 And some misdemeanors can result in loss
of civil rights.34 Because the accusation of an offense resulting in
loss of status is stigmatizing, all misdemeanors carrying these
consequences must be prosecuted by indictment.
More thoughtful evaluation of these cases by a grand jury
before charge would likely result in the nonprosecution of many
cases because current rates of postcharge dismissal are high. If
prosecutors were to charge fewer meritless cases due to the
grand jury process, thousands of Americans would avoid the
stigma of a criminal record in cases where it is unwarranted. The
Framers drafted the Constitution to prevent precisely what is
now occurring—the casual charging of serious offenses. 35
I. THE CONSEQUENCES OF MISDEMEANORS
Misdemeanor offenses and convictions are generally considered to be less serious than felony offenses and convictions. 36
Thus, Justices have noted the special significance of felony convictions. For example, Justice Clark noted that a felony conviction “strips an offender of all civil rights and leaves a shattered
character that only a presidential pardon can mend.” 37 Chief
Justice Warren wrote that “[c]onviction of a felony imposes a status upon a person which not only makes him vulnerable to future
sanctions through new civil disability statutes, but which also
seriously affects his reputation and economic opportunities.” 38
Given this perceived distinction between the weighty felony and
War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6 J.
GENDER, RACE & JUST. 253 (2002).
32. See infra notes 179–191 and accompanying text.
33. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 153–172 and accompanying text.
35. See infra Part II.A.
36. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 70 (1970) (“[A] felony conviction is
more serious than a misdemeanor conviction.”); see also Boyde v. California,
494 U.S. 370, 400 n.80 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[S]erious offenses’ such
as murder, manslaughter, rape, and arson came to be called felonies, whereas
other, presumably ‘less serious’ offenses, came to be called misdemeanors.” (citing 1 C. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 17, at 81 (14th ed. 1978))).
37. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 358 (1960) (Clark, J., dissenting).
38. Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 593–94 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting);
see also Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081 (2015) (“For life, [Yates]
will bear the stigma of having a federal felony conviction.”).
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a misdemeanor, in the federal system misdemeanors may be
prosecuted by information, without action by a grand jury, but
felonies require indictment. 39
The distinction between misdemeanors and felonies, however, turns out to be evanescent. It is, of course, conceivable that
misdemeanors could actually be categorically less serious than
felonies in terms of punishment or other legal consequences. 40
For example, the Model Penal Code provides that some categories of offenses may not give rise to collateral consequences. 41
Congress could, likewise, ensure that federal misdemeanors are
less significant than felonies. However, the principle that misdemeanors are or should be less serious than felonies is not a binding legal command, and, if it ever was, is not currently applied
in practice. A century ago, the D.C. Circuit wrote: “The old distinction between felonies and misdemeanors at the common law
is practically impossible of definition. What is denounced as an
infamous crime is practically a felony in its consequence, though
it may be called a misdemeanor in the statute.” 42 More recently,
Professor Jenny Roberts explained “[t]here is . . . no longer such
a thing as a ‘slap on the wrist.’ All convictions, even for the most
minor of charges, come with a long list of ‘collateral consequences.’” 43
39. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
40. Cf. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L.
REV. 1055 (2015) (arguing that while decriminalization of misdemeanors may
provide relief for overcrowded jails and an overburdened defense bar, it actually
expands the reach of the criminal apparatus by making it easier to impose fines
and supervision).
41. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04(5) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (“An offense defined
by this Code or by any other statute of this State constitutes a violation if it is
so designated in this Code or in the law defining the offense or if no other sentence than a fine, or fine and forfeiture or other civil penalty is authorized upon
conviction or if it is defined by a statute other than this Code that now provides
that the offense shall not constitute a crime. A violation does not constitute a
crime and conviction of a violation shall not give rise to any disability or legal
disadvantage based on conviction of a criminal offense.”).
42. Chambers v. Buroughs, 44 App. D.C. 168, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1915).
43. Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1089, 1126 (2013). Professor Alexandra Natapoff noted that “[o]nce convicted, petty offenders suffer some of the same consequences as their felony
counterparts.” Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313,
1327 (2012); see also, e.g., David P. Baugh, The Consequences of Criminal Convictions for Misdemeanor or Felony Offenses, 18 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC.
JUST. 55, 71 (2011) (“A criminal record, either for a misdemeanor or a felony, is
a blemish for life. No one can ever reach his or her full potential to contribute
to society or to reach some level of self-satisfaction and fulfillment with a criminal record. A jail sentence can last for months or years; a criminal record is a
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Legislatures now regularly impose punishments for particular misdemeanors equal to or exceeding those for felonies and
attach serious collateral consequences to misdemeanors. For example, counterintuitively, a conviction for a misdemeanor offense may constitute a statutory aggravated felony, triggering
mandatory deportation 44 or sentencing enhancement. 45 Misdemeanor sex offenses can lead to sex offender registration. 46 The
Supreme Court recently recognized the pervasive consequences
of a criminal conviction:
[Criminal sanctions] can include not only fines and imprisonment, but
all the attendant consequences of being branded a criminal: deprivation of otherwise protected civil rights, such as the right to bear arms
or vote in elections; loss of employment opportunities; social stigma;
and severe disabilities in other controversies, such as custody or immigration disputes. 47

restriction on a person’s future that lasts for life.”); Erica Hashimoto, The Problem with Misdemeanor Representation, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019, 1041
(2013) (“ To be sure, criminal convictions, including misdemeanor convictions,
can have significant life-altering consequences for the defendant regardless of
the sentence imposed as a result of the conviction.”).
44. See, e.g., Whyte v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 463, 466 (1st Cir. 2015) (“[A] state
misdemeanor conviction can qualify as a federal ‘aggravated felony.’”); United
States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[A] misdemeanor may, in
some cases and consistent with legislative intent, fall within the INA’s definition of ‘aggravated felony.’”); cf. Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 491 (2012)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s reading sweeps a wide variety of federal, state, and local tax offenses—including misdemeanors—into the ‘aggravated felony’ category.”).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Pineda-Cabrera, 604 F. App’x 889, 891 (11th
Cir. 2015) (“[A] theft or burglary conviction that is a misdemeanor under state
law but results in a term of imprisonment of at least one year is an ‘aggravated
felony’” under U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016)); United States v. Villafana, 577 F. App’x 248, 250 (5th Cir.
2014) (“Villafana’s prior conviction for misdemeanor forgery qualified as an aggravated felony for purposes of a sentence enhancement.”).
46. See, e.g., Fushek v. State, 183 P.3d 536, 544 (Ariz. 2008) (“[M]isdemeanor crimes involving sexual motivation are serious offenses and [we] hold
that when a special allegation of sexual motivation exposes a defendant to the
possibility of sex offender registration, Article 2, Section 24 of our Constitution
entitles the defendant to a trial by jury.”); People v. King, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220,
223 (Ct. App. 1993) (“We do not, however, consider the mandatory registration
penalty for misdemeanor violations of section 314 to be facially or inherently
unconstitutional.”); People v. Mann, 859 N.Y.S.2d 278, 280 (App. Div. 2008)
(“ The misdemeanor counts arose from defendant touching the breasts of females ages 13 and younger, which would constitute the crime of sexual abuse
in the second degree if committed in New York (see Penal Law § 130.60[2]), and
is a registrable offense under SORA.”).
47. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 573 (2012); see also,
e.g., Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865 (1985) (“[C]onviction may be used
to impeach the defendant’s credibility and certainly carries the societal stigma
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Tellingly, the Justices did not distinguish between felonies and
misdemeanors; all of the hardships they list can fall on misdemeanants.
Misdemeanors in the U.S. Code involve every sort of dishonorable and morally reprehensible conduct, including conspiracy; 48 theft; 49 embezzlement; 50 fraud; 51 false statement; 52 false
claims; 53 forgery; 54 bribery; 55 and disloyalty. 56 The Code also includes a number of misdemeanor drug offenses. 57 In addition,
under the Assimilative Crimes Act,58 acts that occur on federal
enclaves but violate state law are prosecuted in federal court.
The Act assimilates misdemeanor sex offenses.59 Misdemeanors,
like felonies, appear on criminal background checks and therefore can affect many areas of public and private life. 60 “Employers often decline to interview people who have been convicted of
any offense; 60 to 70 percent of employers state that they would
not hire any ex-offender and the majority of employers perform
background checks.” 61 To use Justice Clark’s phrase, one’s character can be shattered as much by a misdemeanor conviction as
by a felony.62
In addition to their effects on individuals, misdemeanor convictions have substantial social and political consequences. From
accompanying any criminal conviction.”); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224
(1976) (“But given a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State may confine him and
subject him to the rules of its prison system so long as the conditions of confinement do not otherwise violate the Constitution.”).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012).
49. Id. § 655 (theft by bank examiner); id. § 656 (theft by bank officer or
employee).
50. Id. § 1163 (embezzlement or theft from Indian tribal organization).
51. Id. § 1920 (false statement or fraud to obtain Federal Employees’ Compensation); id. § 1923 (fraudulent receipt of payments); 26 U.S.C. § 7207 (2012)
(tax fraud).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1025 (false pretenses on the high seas).
53. Id. § 288 (false claims for postal losses).
54. Id. § 510(c) (forging endorsements on Treasury checks).
55. Id. § 597 (expenditures to influence voting).
56. Id. § 1918. Shainghaiing sailors should be a crime of moral turpitude,
if it is not. Id. § 2194.
57. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(4) (2012) (distributing marijuana); id. § 844 (simple
possession).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 13.
59. United States v. Cox, 929 F.2d 1511, 1512 (10th Cir. 1991).
60. JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 97–98 (2015).
61. Natapoff, supra note 43, at 1325.
62. See Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 358 (1960) (Clark, J., dissenting).
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the end of Reconstruction until as late as the 1960s, various jurisdictions used vague misdemeanor statutes punishing crimes
such as vagrancy to extract labor from African Americans and to
control disfavored groups using the veneer of law. 63 Low-level
offenses continue to be used by the criminal-justice apparatus
for financial ends. 64 Professors Wayne Logan and Ronald Wright
report that surcharges and fees associated with offenses, what
they call LFOs (legal financial obligations) “often have debilitating consequences for individuals.” 65 They note “[r]ecent academic work and advocacy group studies have condemned LFOs
for their economically regressive impact on poor defendants, the
barriers they present to reentry, and the racial disparities they
reflect.” 66 Because “criminal justice actors increasingly rely on
the income from LFOs to fund ordinary system operations,” they
have “become mercenaries, in effect working on commission.”67
A disturbing example was revealed by a Department of Justice investigation in Ferguson, Missouri, following the death of
eighteen-year-old Michael Brown, who was killed after an encounter with a Ferguson Police Department (FPD) officer.68 The
Department of Justice reported that “[t]he Ferguson municipal
court handles most charges brought by FPD, and does so not
with the primary goal of administering justice or protecting the
rights of the accused, but of maximizing revenue.” 69
Notwithstanding their importance, for a range of structural
reasons, misdemeanors are more likely to be erroneously
charged than felonies. First, prosecutors may not screen misdemeanor cases closely. “In the world of petty offenses, the prosecutorial screening function is . . . weaker, [and] in some realms
nonexistent. Prosecutors often charge whatever petty offense the
police report describes and back off, if at all, only later during
63. Gabriel J. Chin, The Jena Six and the History of Racially Compromised
Justice in Louisiana, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 361, 391 (2009). See generally
RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION: POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE,
AND THE MAKING OF THE 1960S (2016) (discussing breadth of police authority in
the mid-twentieth century).
64. See generally ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENT FOR THE POOR (2016) (analyzing the ways in which criminal fines entrench the poor).
65. Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice,
2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175, 1177.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 5.
69. Id. at 42.
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plea negotiations.” 70 Second, because “misdemeanor court judges
are relatively insulated from higher court feedback and do not
learn of their mistakes in the same way that felony trial court
judges do,” there may be more legal errors from the bench. 71 Finally, it is not uncommon for prosecutors and defense attorneys
handling felonies to specialize in particular sorts of serious
crimes, becoming reasonably expert in, say, white-collar drug or
sex offenses. 72 This could mean that, when it comes to felony offenses, prosecutors are less likely to charge meritless cases in
legal areas they know well, and experienced defense attorneys
are more likely to spot problems early on. On the other hand,
“misdemeanor attorneys often handle a large variety of crimes,
codified in a variety of sources.” 73 When an attorney has a docket
that includes traffic and regulatory offenses, as well as lesser
versions of traditional felonies, it is more difficult to learn the
nuances of the variety of statutes involved. In addition, junior or
volunteer attorneys with little knowledge and experience are
sometimes used for misdemeanor cases.74 For all of these reasons, misdemeanor prosecutors and defense attorneys may be
less able to identify and screen out problematic cases, and misdemeanor charges with a low probability of conviction may move
forward.
For these (and perhaps other) reasons, federal misdemeanor
charges are much more likely than felony charges not to result
70. Natapoff, supra note 43, at 1338. See generally ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES,
MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR
COURTS 25–26 (2009) (discussing the over-criminalization of misdemeanors).

71. Eve Brensike Primus, Our Broken Misdemeanor Justice System: Its
Problems and Some Potential Solutions, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 80, 81
(2012).
72. Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 321, 335 (2002) (noting that “[m]any [prosecutor ’s] offices have
sought to increase their efficacy by dividing the office into units based on types
of crimes.”); Charles D. Weisselberg & Su Li, Big Law’s Sixth Amendment: The
Rise of Corporate White-Collar Practices in Large U.S. Law Firms, 53 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1221, 1229 (2011) (discussing specialization of white collar criminal defense attorneys).
73. Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy
in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 305 (2011).
74. As Professor Irene Joe has explained: “Aside from a few circumstances,
public defender administrators do not treat misdemeanor and felony clients
alike when they are forced to ration limited resources. Instead, decisionmakers
minimize the resources dedicated to misdemeanor representation so they can
concentrate their efforts on felony representation.” Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe,
Rethinking Misdemeanor Neglect, 64 UCLA L. REV. 738, 743 (2017).
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in a conviction. For example, Table 1 shows the percent of misdemeanors and felonies that were charged but failed to result in
a conviction for years 2009 through 2012.
Table 1: Charges Not Leading To Conviction
Year
2009 A
2010 B
2011 C
2012 D

Misdemeanors Not
Leading to Conviction
30.5%
28.6%
29.6%
31.1%

Felonies Not Leading to Conviction
6.7%
6.1%
6.4%
6.6%

A. MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 233464, FEDERAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 2009–STATISTICAL TABLES 18–19 tbl.4.2 (2011),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09st.pdf.
B. MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 239914, FEDERAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 2010–STATISTICAL TABLES 17 tbl.4.2 (2013),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs10st.pdf.
C. MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 248469, FEDERAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2011–STATISTICAL TABLES 17 tbl.4.2 (2015),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs11st.pdf.
D. MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 248470, FEDERAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2012–STATISTICAL TABLES 17 tbl.4.2 (2015),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs12st.pdf.

Thus from 2009 through 2012, misdemeanants were between four and five times as likely to be charged but not convicted compared to felons.
II. DEFINING INFAMOUS CRIMES
The Supreme Court’s Grand Jury Clause jurisprudence in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries suggests, consistent with the drafting history of the Constitution, that offenses potentially resulting in stigmatizing punishments must
be prosecuted by grand jury indictment—but that is not the rule
today. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure now employ a
bright line rule: Felonies must be charged by indictment, in the
absence of a defendant’s waiver of their grand jury right, but
misdemeanors need not be considered by a grand jury. 75 But the
Fifth Amendment does not mention felonies or misdemeanors.
Instead, the textual requirement is that “capital, or otherwise
75. See supra note 1.
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infamous crime[s]” must be charged by indictment. 76 The Supreme Court has specifically rejected the felony/misdemeanor
distinction as the dividing line, holding that misdemeanors having the quality of infamy must be charged by indictment. 77
A. STIGMA AND INFAMOUS CRIMES
Understanding the purpose of the grand jury illuminates
the problem the Framers were trying to solve, and therefore
what an infamous crime might be. The structure of the Bill of
Rights reveals that the grand jury does not exist primarily to
ensure that only the guilty are ultimately convicted and punished. The Constitution guards against wrongful conviction and
punishment through rights associated with the ultimate factfinding process, such as the right to counsel, and the right to a
jury trial.78 The standard for indictment by grand jury is probable cause, a minimal threshold, which prevents few, if any, provably guilty people from being charged.79 The grand jury requirement, therefore, offers little comfort to the provably guilty; they
will be indicted.80
To be sure, grand juries have discretion not to indict, or to
indict for a lesser rather than greater crime. 81 But it is said that
76. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
77. See infra notes 126–133 and accompanying text.
78. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 420 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“Our society has a high degree of confidence in its criminal trials, in no small
part because the Constitution offers unparalleled protections against convicting
the innocent.” (citing id. at 398–99, and listing presumption of innocence, proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the rights to confrontation, compulsory process,
assistance of effective counsel, and disclosure of exculpatory evidence, but not
grand jury indictment)).
79. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 586 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (“For
the provision of indictment by grand jury does not protect innocent defendants
from unjust convictions. Rather, it helps to assure that innocent persons will
not be made unjustly to stand trial at all.”); see also United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) (stating that the purpose of grand jury
investigation is “to ascertain whether probable cause exists.”).
80. The percentage of defendants for whom there would be legally sufficient
evidence of guilt after a trial, yet for whom there is insufficient probable cause
to obtain a grand jury indictment, is zero in theory and likely near zero in practice. United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 67 (1986) (“We believe that the
petit jury’s verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt demonstrates a fortiori
that there was probable cause to charge the defendants with the offenses for
which they were convicted.”).
81. As the Court explained:
The grand jury does not determine only that probable cause exists to
believe that a defendant committed a crime, or that it does not. In the
hands of the grand jury lies the power to charge a greater offense or a
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the prosecutor has a great deal of control over grand juries, and
that a grand jury “would ‘indict a ham sandwich if asked to do
so.’” 82 Further, there is no evidence that grand juries regularly
decline to indict in the face of solid evidence in a case the prosecutor wants to pursue.
A key function, perhaps the key function, of the grand jury
is to prevent unwarranted stigmatization of people who would
later be acquitted. 83 Thus scholars including Akhil Amar 84 and
lesser offense; numerous counts or a single count; and perhaps most
significant of all, a capital offense or a noncapital offense—all on the
basis of the same facts. Moreover, “[t]he grand jury is not bound to indict in every case where a conviction can be obtained.” United States v.
Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 629 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., dissenting).
Thus, even if a grand jury’s determination of probable cause is confirmed in hindsight by a conviction on the indicted offense, that confirmation in no way suggests that the discrimination did not impermissibly infect the framing of the indictment and, consequently, the nature
or very existence of the proceedings to come.
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986); see also United States v. Cotton,
535 U.S. 625, 634 (2002) (“Respondents emphasize that the Fifth Amendment
grand jury right serves a vital function in providing for a body of citizens that
acts as a check on prosecutorial power. No doubt that is true.”).
82. Josh Levin, The Judge Who Coined “Indict a Ham Sandwich” Was Himself Indicted, SLATE (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/lexicon_valley/
2014/11/25/sol_wachtler_the_judge_who_coined_indict_a_ham_sandwich_was_
himself_indicted.html. Some have challenged this view, arguing that state
grand juries do exercise discretion. Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand
Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L.
REV. 1, 35 (2002) (“Similarly, in the early 1980s statistics showed that New York
grand juries dismissed approximately 10% of their cases and reduced charges
in almost as many.”). Others have persuasively argued for expanding the power
of the grand jury to exercise discretion as the voice of the community. Kevin K.
Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 2346 (2008)
(“[T]he grand jury may have one important responsibility that suggests that its
role is to review the sufficiency of the evidence for indictments. But the historical narrative also suggests some other roles and responsibilities: considering
the legitimacy of laws, and/or considering the legitimacy of the application of
those laws in a particular case.”).
83. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 n.15 (1973) (concluding that a
grand jury is “a means of protecting the citizen against unfounded accusation,
whether it comes from government, or be prompted by partisan passion or private enmity”; Commonwealth v. Harris, 121 N.E. 409, 410 (Mass. 1919) (“[T]hat
the twelfth article of the Bill of Rights in part was aimed and intended to prohibit the scandal and disgrace of a trial in public of persons charged with infamous crimes and offences when, in truth, there was no sufficient cause to suspect their guilt.”); cf. Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211,
219 (1979) (explaining that one reason for secrecy of grand jury proceedings is
to “assure that persons who are accused but exonerated by the grand jury will
not be held up to public ridicule”).
84. Professor Amar explained:
[T]o make full sense of the text, we must focus on the harms inherent
in every criminal accusation. Every criminal accusation, of course, is

2018]

INFAMOUS MISDEMEANORS

1925

Stephanos Bibas 85 agree that the grand jury serves to prevent
charging people against whom there is so little evidence of guilt
that reputation rather than liberty is at stake. The Framers of
the Constitution took honor and reputation seriously.86 One
early federal judge explained that:
[English] laws have wisely and humanely considered, that next to the
disgrace of being convicted of an infamous offence, is the dishonour of
being charged with one; and therefore, before they would submit a subject to the danger and inconvenience of being publicly arraigned, an
impartial jury are on their oaths to declare the just cause for accusation. 87

Other courts agree that “[t]he Grand Jury is a safeguard designed to protect the reputation of the accused, to avert the

an attack on the accused’s reputation——a charge of “criminal” wrongdoing in the words of the Speedy Trial Clause, of “infamous” misconduct in the analogous words of the Grand Jury Clause. At common law,
a false accusation of criminal behavior was viewed as defamation per
se. (Note the obvious etymological link between defamation and accusations of infamous crime). And as with pretrial detention, each additional day of accusation was a fresh assault, a new injury. Here too, the
innocent man would want a trial to speedily follow accusation, so that
he could offer his “answer ” and put on his “defence.” And if the innocent
man can prevail at this speedy, public, and fair trial, he puts an end to
the accusation of infamy and wins back his good name.
Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 661
(1996).
85. See Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1182 (2001) (“Juries were
meant to check the imposition of stigma, as reflected in the Grand Jury Clause’s
limitation to ‘infamous’ crimes.”).
86. One famous example of the importance of reputation in Western culture
comes from literature. In Shakespeare’s Othello, Iago says to Othello:
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash; ’tis something, nothing;
’Twas mine, ’tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3. sc. 3. The Milkovich Court quoted the
same excerpt during its discussion of the development of defamation law. See
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 12 (1990) (describing one purpose
of defamation law as “obtaining redress for harm caused by [false] statements”).
Even an acquittal is no substitute for being subjected to baseless charges: “Former Secretary of Labor, Ray Donovan, famously asked after his acquittal in a
1987 corruption trial, ‘Where do I go to get my reputation back?’” Frederick
Lawrence, Declaring Innocence: Use of Declaratory Judgments to Vindicate the
Wrongly Convicted, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 391, 399 (2009).
87. United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 838 (D.S.C. 1799).
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stigma of prosecution unless there is reasonable ground for proceeding.88
The drafting history of the Bill of Rights also suggests that
the grand jury is concerned with pretrial stigma, not postconviction punishment. Introduced by James Madison on June 8, 1789,
at the first session of the House of Representatives, the Amendment originally read: “In all crimes punishable with loss of life
or member, presentment or indictment by a grand jury shall be
an essential preliminary.” 89 Thus the initial focus was on punishment and for a limited number of crimes. This draft went to

88. United States v. Echols, 413 F. Supp. 8, 9 n.2 (E.D. La. 1975) (quoting
Note, Quashing Federal Indictments Returned Upon Incompetent Evidence,
62 HARV. L. REV. 111, 114 (1948)); see, e.g., United States v. Smith, 982 F.2d
757, 762 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[T]he infamy of the punishment is essentially a measure of the infamy attached to the offender: by authorizing an infamous punishment, the Congress indicates that it believes the offender deserving of infamy.”);
Gardes v. United States, 87 F. 172, 185 (5th Cir. 1898) (describing imprisonment as “stamp[ing] the convict with the stigma of subjection to an infamous
punishment.”); United States v. Nott, 27 F. Cas. 189, 192 (C.C.D. Ohio 1839)
(“ The law had been violated and its penalty incurred. You must be cut off from
society; and from your nearest and dearest connections. You must put on the
badges of disgrace, and be associated with men rendered infamous by crime.”);
Grinbaum v. Superior Court ex rel. S.F., 221 P. 635, 646 (Cal. 1923) (“As such
an appointment [of a conservator] takes from the person the possession and
control of his property and even his freedom of person, and commits his property, his person, his liberty to another, stamps him with the stigma of insanity
and degrades him in public estimation, no more important order touching a man
can be made, short of conviction of infamous crime.”; In re Request of Governor
for Advisory Op., 950 A.2d 651, 657 (Del. 2008) (“An act of civil delinquency by
a juvenile, to which the General Assembly intentionally avoided attaching permanent stigma, is incompatible with the concept of an ‘infamous crime.’”); State
v. Kearney, 8 N.C. 53, 54 (1820) (stating it is still true, generally, that “public
corporal punishment for any offence impresses an indelible stigma on the character, and ought to be inflicted on those offences only which are infamous in
their nature.”).
89. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 424 (1885) (emphasis added); see Roger
A. Fairfax, Jr., The Jurisdictional Heritage of the Grand Jury Clause, 91 MINN.
L. REV. 398, 458 (2006) (stating that there was minimal discussion during the
ratification debates in regard to grand juries); see also THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 265 (Neil H. Cogan ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1997) (1788) [hereinafter COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS]
(James Madison argued that Article III, Section Two, should contain a provision
stating that “presentment or indictment by a grand jury shall be an essential
preliminary” to criminal cases); GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION: A COMMENTARY app. J-1, at 318 (1995) (including selected sections of James Madison’s proposals to the House of Representatives on June 8,
1789). “Delegate Aedanus Burke of South Carolina was particularly adamant
that the Constitution prohibit prosecutions from being initiated by information.” Fairfax, supra, at 412 n.58.
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the Committee of the Whole.90 The following month, new language was suggested by Roger Sherman: “No person shall be
tried for any crime whereby he may incur loss of life or any infamous punishment, without Indictment by a grand Jury . . . .” 91 A
report from the House Committee of Eleven—proposed at the
same time as Sherman’s recommendation—read, “[N]o person
shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment by a grand jury
. . . .” 92 That version became, and has remained, part of the Constitution. 93
The drafting history reflects expansion of the coverage of the
Clause. The original version limited the grand jury indictment
requirement to crimes involving punishments of loss of life or
limb.94 Roger Sherman’s version changed the requirement to include capital or infamous punishments, even if there was no execution or amputation—a clear extension. 95 The Framers chose
a third version linked to the capital or otherwise infamous nature of the crime; that is, a prosecutor could not avoid the necessity of seeking an indictment by committing in advance not to
impose certain punishments.96 The Framers also advanced the
relevant time period: Sherman’s draft required an indictment
before trial, 97 whereas the enacted version moved the requirement back to the earlier step of being “held to answer.” 98 This
drafting sequence is consistent with the idea that what is at
stake, what the Amendment regulates, is impairment of reputation and not imposition of punishment.
90. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 759–60 (1789–1790).
91. COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 89, at 266 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
94. See COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 89, at 265 (“ The trial of all
crimes . . . shall be by an impartial jury . . . [with] all crimes punishable with
loss of life or limb . . . .”).
95. See id. at 266 (providing Sherman’s proposal regarding the Grand Jury
Clause).
96. The Supreme Court now holds that a person charged with a misdemeanor punishable by incarceration is not entitled to counsel if the prosecutor
and court agree that incarceration is off the table. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S.
367, 369 (1979); see also Russell Christopher, Penalizing and Chilling an Indigent’s Exercise of the Right to Appointed Counsel for Misdemeanors, 99 IOWA L.
REV. 1905 (2014) (“In Scott v. Illinois, the Supreme Court clarified that even
those charged with misdemeanors in which imprisonment is an authorized punishment are not necessarily constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel.”).
97. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
98. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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The Court has indicated that a punishment that “always implies disgrace” is infamous.99 Dictionaries at the time of the
framing of the Constitution also understood infamy in reputational terms, defining infamy as “[p]ublick reproach; notoriety of
bad character,” 100 and infamous as “of evil report, scandalous,
base.” 101 Over the past two centuries, the dictionary definition
has not changed. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines infamous as: “well-known for being bad[;] known for evil acts or
crimes[;] causing people to think you are bad or evil.” 102
There is a clear reason for the Amendment’s concern with
reputation. As a Harvard Law Review article explained, “[i]t has
long been considered slander per se orally to accuse one of a
crime involving ‘moral turpitude’ or subject to an ‘infamous punishment.’” 103 Many courts have held that a statement is actionable without proof of special damages if it “would subject the party
charged to an indictment for a crime involving moral turpitude,
or subject her to infamous punishment.” 104 At the time of the
99. In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 169 (1890).
100. Infamy, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1086 (1755); see 2 A
COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 41 (4th ed. 1797).
101. Infamous, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY 447
(26th ed. 1789).
102. Infamous MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam
-webster.com/dictionary/infamous (last visited Feb. 18, 2018).
103. Note, Developments in the Law—Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 887
n.73 (1956); see FRANCIS M. BURDICK, LAW OF TORTS 372 n.57 (4th ed. 1926);
Roscellus S. Guernsey, When a Libel Is Not a Libel, 20 YALE L.J. 36, 39 (1910)
(“A misdemeanor is ordinarily not punishable by an infamous punishment;
hence, in order that a charge of such offense may be actionable per se, it is necessary that it be indictable and involve moral turpitude. A charge of petit larceny is not a libel if false, unless it is a misdemeanor under the penal code.”);
Libel and Slander—Privileged Communication, 23 YALE L.J. 99, 99 (1913)
(“Words which charge the plaintiff with the commission of a crime involving
moral turpitude or subjecting the offender to infamous punishment are slanderous per se.”); see also 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 124 (“[W]ith regard to words that do not thus apparently, and upon
the face of them, import such defamation as will of course be injurious, it is
necessary that the plaintiff should aver some particular damage to have happened . . . .”); P.J.T., Torts—Slander—Words Actionable Per Se, 10 TEX. L.
REV. 390, 391 (1932) (“[W]ords are actionable per se when the offense which
they charge renders the party liable to an indictment for a crime involving moral
turpitude or subjecting him to infamous punishment.” (citing Pollard v. Lyon,
91 U.S. 225, 226 (1876))).
104. Butler v. Carter & Russell Pub. Co., 135 F. 69, 71 (5th Cir. 1905); see,
e.g., Brooker v. Coffin, 5 Johns. 188, 188 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) (“ The rule seems
to be, that where the charge, if true, will subject the party charged to an indictment for a crime, involving moral turpitude, or subject him to an infamous punishment, then the words are in themselves actionable.”); Shipp v. McCraw, 7
N.C. 463, 466 (1819) (Henderson, J., concurring) (“ The gravamen in an action
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framing, as now, prosecutors were immune from suit for their
charging decisions.105 Accordingly, allowing the prosecution of
offenses affecting reputation by information would permit accusations, which the law recognized as intrinsically damaging, but
with no legal recourse if they turned out to be unwarranted. 106
Since at least some charges would be baseless, unaccountable
prosecutorial freedom would have been unjust.
That the Grand Jury Clause was designed to avoid unwarranted stigma suggests that it should be contextual; the Court
has recognized that “[w]hat punishments shall be considered as
infamous may be affected by the changes of public opinion from
one age to another.” 107 And because the interest at stake is reputational, it does not matter whether the stigmatizing punishment is actually imposed: “[I]n determining whether the crime
is infamous, the question is whether it is one for which the statute authorizes the court to award an infamous punishment, and
not whether the punishment ultimately awarded is an infamous

of slander, is social degradation. The risk of punishment, and the rule to test
the question whether the words be or be not actionable, to wit: does the charge
impute an infamous crime, is resorted to, to ascertain the fact, whether it be a
social degradation, and not whether the risk of punishment be incurred. And
this rule is the test of that; for those who are punished for infamous crimes are
degraded from their rank as citizens, they lose their privileges as freemen, their
liberam legem, and are no longer boni et legales homines.”); Boucher v. Clark
Pub. Co., 84 N.W. 237, 238 (S.D. 1900) (“Any publication which imputes to a
person the commission of a criminal offense, which will, in case the imputation
or charge is true, subject the party charged to punishment for a crime involving
moral turpitude, or subject such party to an infamous punishment, is actionable
. . . .”); Redway v. Gray, 31 Vt. 292, 297 (1858) (“ They impute an infamous
crime, involving moral turpitude, and subject the person guilty of such an offence to corporal punishment, and it has always been held, that when all these
concur, the words are actionable per se.”).
105. See Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity,
2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 53, 81 (2005) (noting that the Supreme Court found “the
common-law rule of absolute prosecutorial immunity to be ‘well settled’” (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427–28 (1976))).
106. Id.
107. Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 351 (1886); see Ex parte Wilson,
114 U.S. 417, 427–28 (1885) (“In former times, being put in the stocks was not
considered as necessarily infamous. And by the first Judiciary Act of the United
States, whipping was classed with moderate fines and short terms of imprisonment . . . . But at the present day either stocks or whipping might be thought
an infamous punishment.”).
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one.” 108 An accusation of conduct warranting degrading sanctions if a conviction were to occur is sufficient to trigger the
Clause. 109
The reasons for the Grand Jury Clause, and therefore the
tests for infamy, differ from other criminal law entitlements. For
example, the right to appointed counsel for an indigent person
charged with a misdemeanor depends on whether there is the
possibility of actual incarceration.110 The right to trial by jury for
a misdemeanor depends on whether punishment of more than
six months is authorized. 111 Both of these turn on trial outcome
and seriousness of the effects of conviction, not the reputational
effect of an accusation as such.112
The purpose of preventing unwarranted stigma helps to explain why many errors with respect to a grand jury are cured by
a valid guilty verdict by a trial jury. 113 Yet, complete denial of a
108. In re Claasen, 140 U.S. 200, 205 (1891); see Mackin, 117 U.S. at 351
(“ The test is whether the crime is one for which the statutes authorize the court
to award an infamous punishment, not whether the punishment ultimately
awarded is an infamous one . . . .”); Wilson, 114 U.S. at 426 (“ The question is
whether the crime is one for which the statutes authorize the court to award an
infamous punishment, not whether the punishment awarded is an infamous
one.”).
109. Wilson, 114 U.S. at 426 (describing the accused’s right and that it triggers the clause).
110. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (“We hold, therefore, that
absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any
offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.”).
111. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968) (“So-called petty offenses
were tried without juries both in England and in the Colonies and have always
been held to be exempt from the otherwise comprehensive language of the Sixth
Amendment’s jury trial provisions.”).
112. On the other hand, some of these cases nodded to concepts related to
infamy. In Duncan, the Court identified the question as whether “the length of
the authorized prison term or the seriousness of other punishment is enough in
itself to require a jury trial . . . .” Id. at 161. The Court there cited District of
Columbia v. Clawans, which noted that at common law, petty offenses were
“punished by commitment to jail, a workhouse, or a house of correction.”
300 U.S. 617, 624 (1937). Thus, this line leaves open the possibility that the
place of incarceration is relevant to the jury trial right.
113. United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 67 (1986) (“[T]he petit jury’s
verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt demonstrates a fortiori that there
was probable cause to charge the defendants with the offenses for which they
were convicted. Therefore, the convictions must stand despite the rule violation.”); see United States v. Navarro, 608 F.3d 529, 539 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing remedies for errors ruled upon before and after trial); United States v. SotoBeniquez, 356 F.3d 1, 25 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that “[a]ll but the most serious
errors before the grand jury are rendered harmless by a conviction at trial”).
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grand jury indictment even as to a palpably guilty defendant requires a remedy, to protect innocent people who would be tried
and acquitted if lack of an indictment were always cured by conviction. 114
The original view of courts and scholars was that “it is the
infamous nature of the crime and not the character of the punishment” that makes an offense infamous. 115 However, in the
late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court defined “infamy” for
purposes of the Grand Jury Clause to include all offenses authorizing imposition of infamous penalties. 116 That is, a grand jury
indictment was required for an offense, which was not itself infamous (in that its elements did not imply disgrace), if that offense could lead to infamous punishment. These decisions represented application of the indictment requirement to a new
category of cases.
The Court has made clear that the infamous nature of the
punishment brings an offense into the scope of the Grand Jury
Clause. 117 However, the Court has not explicitly determined
114. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960) (“While there was a
variance in the sense of a variation between pleading and proof, that variation
here destroyed the defendant’s substantial right to be tried only on charges presented in an indictment returned by a grand jury. Deprivation of such a basic
right is far too serious to be treated as nothing more than a variance and then
dismissed as harmless error.”); see Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States,
489 U.S. 794, 802 (1989) (“Only a defect so fundamental that it causes the grand
jury no longer to be a grand jury, or the indictment no longer to be an indictment, gives rise to the constitutional right not to be tried.”).
115. Witnesses—Competency in General—Effect in Criminal Trial in Federal
Courts of Former Conviction of Crime in State Courts, 30 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529
(1917) (citing People v. Park, 41 N.Y. 21, 29–30 (1869)); see Bartholomew v. People, 104 Ill. 601, 607 (1882); The King v. Priddle, 1 Leach C. C. 442, 442–43; 3
SIMON GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 372, n.1 (15th ed. 1892)); see also People v.
Toynbee, 1855 WL 6562 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1855) (“It was the infamy of the crime,
and not the nature of the punishment, which constituted the crimen falsi.”);
Infamy and Infamous Crimes, 16 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPAEDIA
OF LAW (Davis S. Garland & Lucius P. McGehee eds., 2d ed. 1900) (“But at present it is the settled rule of the common law that it is the character of the crime,
and not the nature of the punishment, which creates the infamy and destroys
the competency of the witness. At present, therefore, a conviction of treason or
felony, or of any species of the crimen falsi, will incapacitate the party convicted
from giving evidence while it continues in force without regard to the punishment inflicted.”); Infamous Crime—Definition, 15 YALE L.J. 305 (1906) (“[T]he
decision as to the infamy of the offense depended, not on the punishment prescribed, but in the character of the offense itself and that the statutory offense
of which appellant was convicted did not involve the requisite degree of moral
turpitude to make the transgression an infamous crime at common law.”).
116. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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whether the stigmatizing nature of an offense, in and of itself,
makes it infamous—that is, the Court has not clarified whether
the former rule, defining infamy based on stigmatizing crimes,
was expanded (to include stigmatizing punishments and stigmatizing crimes) or replaced, meaning that only stigmatizing consequences could make an offense infamous, regardless of the
stigmatizing nature of the crime itself.
For several reasons, the decisions should be read as expanding the category of infamous crimes. First, the Clause’s drafting
history shows that the Framers were initially concerned with
imposition of infamous punishment, but ultimately decided to
regulate charging infamous crimes, presumably because, in addition to punishment, they were concerned with stigma. 118 Second, conduct is a more direct signifier of disgrace than punishment. As a matter of logic, if we assume average Americans do
not regularly read sentencing statutes, they are more likely to
have a negative reaction to a shameful crime than they are to
know the particular punishment associated with a nonstigmatizing offense. If the indirect stigma resulting from potential
punishment requires indictment, as the Supreme Court has
held, then direct stigma based on the accusation itself also
should. Accordingly, stigmatizing offenses should be charged by
a grand jury even if no infamous punishment is authorized. 119
Perhaps this question was never resolved because it never
needed to be resolved. There seem to be few, if any, offenses involving stigmatizing conduct which do not carry stigmatizing
penalties.120

118. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
119. Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 775 (Ind. 2011) (“ This history not only
demonstrates that disenfranchisement (along with the loss of other civil and
political rights) was itself an infamous punishment, but it also suggests that,
for purposes of the Infamous Crimes Clause, an infamous crime is one which by
its own nature is infamous, irrespective of punishment.”); cf. WILLIAM EDEN
AUCKLAND, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW § 3, at 51–52 (“Corporal punishments,
immediately affecting the body, and publickly [sic] inflicted, ought to be infamous in the estimation of the people; so should degradations from titles of honor,
civil incapacities, brandings, and public exhibitions of the offender: all which
penalties should be applied with great caution, and only to offences infamous in
their nature.” (emphases added)).
120. 4 WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 15.1(b), at 742 (4th
ed. 2004) (“So too, any crime that could be viewed as infamous by virtue of its
‘nature’ almost certainly will carry an infamous punishment.”).
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B. CONGRESS, THE COURT, AND INFAMOUS MISDEMEANORS
It is completely clear that misdemeanors can be infamous.
For its part, Congress has recognized that misdemeanors can be
infamous. For example, immigration law has long authorized deportation of noncitizens convicted of certain “felonies or other infamous crimes.” 121
The Supreme Court has also recognized that misdemeanors
can be infamous. For example, Richardson v. Ramirez referred
to “felonies or infamous crimes;” 122 Justice Thomas, quoting
Thomas Jefferson, referred to the effect of conviction “of felony,
or other infamous crime” 123 on eligibility for federal office.
In two cases, the Court held that particular misdemeanors
were infamous. In Bannon v. United States, 124 a defendant
claimed that an indictment was defective because it failed to accuse him of feloniously participating in a conspiracy. The Government conceded that the crime was infamous because it was
punishable by confinement at hard labor, but the Court rejected
the defense claim, holding that it does not “necessarily follow
that because the punishment affixed to an offence is infamous,
the offence itself is thereby raised to the grade of felony.”125

121. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360–61 (2010) (“In 1891, Congress added to the list of excludable persons those ‘who have been convicted of
a felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.’”)
(quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084)); Ekiu v. United States, 142
U.S. 651, 664 n.1 (1892) (quoting text of act).
122. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 48 (1974) (noting that “29
States had provisions in their constitutions which prohibited, or authorized the
legislature to prohibit, exercise of the franchise by persons convicted of felonies
or infamous crimes”).
123. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 874 (1995) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (quoting Letter to Joseph C. Cabell (Jan. 31, 1814), in 14 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 82–83 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904)); see Ansbro v.
United States, 159 U.S. 695, 697 (1895) (“ The offence for which Ansbro was
indicted is not punishable by imprisonment for a term of over one year or at
hard labor; and persons convicted thereof cannot be sentenced to imprisonment
in a penitentiary. Rev. St. §§ 5541, 5542. Ansbro was not convicted, therefore,
of an infamous crime.”); Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225, 233 (1875) (the question
is “whether they impute a charge of felony or any other infamous crime punishable by law”).
124. 156 U.S. 464 (1895).
125. Id. at 467 (“If such imprisonment were made the sole test of felonies, it
would necessarily follow that a great many offences of minor importance, such
as selling distilled liquors without payment of the special tax, and other analogous offences under the internal and customs revenue laws, would be treated as
felonies, and the persons guilty of such offences stigmatized as felons.”).
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Similarly, in United States v. Moreland,126 the Court held
that a potential sentence to hard labor was infamous even for a
crime Congress graded as a misdemeanor.127 The Ninth Circuit
explained: “In Moreland, the Court necessarily rejected the felony-misdemeanor distinction when it held that hard labor, imposed as punishment for the misdemeanor of willfully [sic] neglecting to support minor children, is infamous punishment and
triggers the right to an indictment.” 128 The D.C. Circuit agreed:
“if the penalty imposed by statute for the punishment of a misdemeanor is infamous . . . the misdemeanor itself is regarded by
the courts as an infamous crime, and not triable upon information.” 129 Many other lower federal courts have held or suggested that a misdemeanor can be infamous if infamous penalties are authorized.130
Three decisions of various U.S. Courts of Appeal hold or suggest that misdemeanors never need be indicted, sometimes relying on the concept of petty offense, which exempts certain minor
offenses from the jury trial requirement.131 These decisions,
126. 258 U.S. 433 (1922).
127. Id. at 435.
128. United States v. Ramirez, 556 F.2d 909, 924 (9th Cir. 1976).
129. Cleveland v. Mattingly, 287 F. 948, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
130. The cases of which the authors are aware are: United States v. Francisco, 413 F. App’x 216, 218 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Where no ‘infamous’ punishment
is prescribed, petty offenses and misdemeanors may be prosecuted by information.”); Taylor v. United States, 142 F.2d 808, 816 (9th Cir. 1944) (“And it is
well settled that a prosecution for misdemeanors, such as those under consideration in this appeal, involving no infamous crime or no infamous punishment,
may be by information.”); Falconi v. United States, 280 F. 766, 767 (6th Cir.
1922) (“In the case of Wong Wing v. U.S., 163 U.S. 228 . . . the Supreme Court
held that a statute authorizing imprisonment at hard labor for a definite period
inflicts an infamous punishment, and therefore the offense, though a misdemeanor, is an infamous crime, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.”);
United States v. Reef, 268 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (D. Colo. 1967) (“Although the
offense with which defendant is charged is technically a misdemeanor,” indictment is required); United States v. Sloan, 31 F. Supp. 327, 331 (W.D.S.C. 1940)
(“No specific provision, making the particular misdemeanor infamous, is coupled with the punishment of imprisonment prescribed by this statute.”); United
States v. Yates, 6 F. 861, 865 (E.D.N.Y. 1881) (“ The omission to declare the
crime a felony furnishes, no doubt, a reason for considering the crime to be a
misdemeanor, but the fact that the offence is a misdemeanor is not conclusive
of the question whether it be an infamous crime or not . . . .”).
131. United States v. Moncier, 492 F. App’x 507, 510 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Such
a Class B misdemeanor is a ‘petty’ offense, 18 U.S.C. § 19, that does not entitle
Moncier to a grand-jury indictment.”); United States v. Bator, 421 F. App’x 710,
710 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Because the offenses charged were only petty offenses, a
grand jury was not required . . . .”); Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 935
(9th Cir. 2005) (stating, in dicta, that the grand jury requirement is inapplicable

2018]

INFAMOUS MISDEMEANORS

1935

however, are hardly dispositive. Two are nonprecedential unpublished decisions, and in the third, the statement is dicta. In
addition, all three address the issue only in passing. For example, they do not analyze any of the controlling Supreme Court
cases holding that misdemeanors can be infamous, including
Bannon v. United States 132 and United States v. Moreland, 133 nor
do they address the contrary authority from their own circuits. 134
This is understandable because, at least in Moncier and Means,
the two cases for which briefs are available online, the defendants did not develop arguments that the misdemeanors with
which they were charged were infamous.
C. WHAT CATEGORIES OF MISDEMEANORS ARE INFAMOUS?
Several qualities can make a misdemeanor, or any crime for
that matter, infamous. As explained below, the crime may be
subject to a punishment of imprisonment in a “state prison or
penitentiary,” it may result in a loss of civil status, or it may be
a crime of moral turpitude or a crimen falsi.
1. Federal Imprisonment
The Supreme Court held in 1888 that “imprisonment in a
state prison or penitentiary, with or without hard labor, is an
infamous punishment.” 135 As a modern Second Circuit case explained, the Court “viewed prisons and penitentiaries as places
of punishment . . . while viewing correctional facilities open only
to minor offenders as centers for rehabilitation.” 136
The Court’s holdings that a person must be indicted by a
to tribal courts, and “[t]he right to grand jury indictment would not pertain regardless, because Means is charged with a misdemeanor.”).
132. 156 U.S. 464 (1895).
133. 258 U.S. 433 (1922).
134. See Sixth and Ninth Circuit cases cited supra in notes 128 & 130.
135. United States v. DeWalt, 128 U.S. 393, 394 (1888); see In re Mills, 135
U.S. 263, 267 (1890) (“[T]his court decided, in respect to crimes against the
United States that are punishable by ‘imprisonment,’ that being punishable by
imprisonment in a state prison or penitentiary, they are infamous, within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, whether the accused is or
is not put to hard labor, and, therefore, can be proceeded against only by presentment or indictment of a grand jury.”); Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 428
(1885) (“For more than a century, imprisonment at hard labor in the State
prison or penitentiary or other similar institution has been considered an infamous punishment in England and America.”); cf. Brede v. Powers, 263 U.S. 4,
13 (1923) (statute providing for “suitable employment of prisoners” not at hard
labor and not for purposes of punishment is not infamous).
136. United States v. Smith, 982 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Wilson,
114 U.S. at 428–29; Moreland, 258 U.S. at 440).
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grand jury before being charged with a crime punishable by incarceration in a state prison seems odd, given that the Grand
Jury Clause applies only to federal prosecutions, which, after
conviction, would likely result in the defendant being sentenced
to federal prison. However, when this line of cases developed,
federal prisoners were often confined in state institutions. 137
Thus, for example, a person convicted in federal court in 1892 for
violating the Chinese Exclusion Act and sentenced to sixty days
at hard labor was confined in the Detroit House of Correction,
not a federal facility. 138
No court, apparently, has questioned the continuing validity
of the Supreme Court decisions holding that a crime is infamous
and requires grand jury indictment if it carries a potential sentence to a “state prison or penitentiary.” 139 In addition, nothing
suggests a constitutional difference between a sentence to a federal prison or penitentiary rather than to a state prison or penitentiary. 140 Even since the development of the modern system of
federal prisons, the Court continues to refer to the “‘infamous
punishment’ of imprisonment.” 141 Therefore, now that the federal government confines most of its own convicts, “the distinction between prisons, where only serious offenders may be
housed, and jails, where misdemeanants are housed, is, as it has
been, the critical one.” 142
137. Creekmore v. United States, 237 F. 743, 754 (8th Cir. 1916) (“It must
be borne in mind that, while nearly all of the states have both penitentiaries
and jails, the United States has no prisons except its penitentiaries, save as it
has the use of state institutions.”).
138. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 229 (1896).
139. DeWalt, 128 U.S. at 394.
140. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 137–38 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring) (using prison and penitentiary synonymously); Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 581 n.9 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“As ‘often’ used, a ‘prison’ is
‘an institution for the imprisonment of persons convicted of major crimes or felonies: a penitentiary as distinguished from a reformatory, local jail, or detention
home.’” (quoting WEBSTER ’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1804 (1961))).
141. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 104 (1997) (quoting Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)).
142. United States v. Smith, 982 F.2d 757, 761–62 (2d Cir. 1992); see, e.g.,
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616 (1994) (contrasting “light penalties
such as fines or short jail sentences” to “imprisonment in the state penitentiary.”); United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 440 (1922) (stating a sentence
to a house of correction was not necessarily infamous: “Its purpose is reformation, instruction in conduct, and diversion from a criminal career. To make
it, therefore, a penitentiary would defeat the purpose of its creation.”); Cahill v.
Biddle, 13 F.2d 827, 829 (8th Cir. 1926) (“In popular estimation, imprisonment
in a penitentiary has generally been considered as more ignominious punishment than imprisonment in a jail . . . .”); Brown v. United States, 260 F. 752,

2018]

INFAMOUS MISDEMEANORS

1937

Because current sentencing statutes—including the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984—were drafted without apparent attention to the scope of the Grand Jury Clause, all federal offenses
carrying the possibility of incarceration are infamous, given they
all authorize confinement in federal prison. Imagine Jane Smith
is convicted of a federal infraction—the lowest level of offense,
below a Class C misdemeanor—and receives the maximum term
of imprisonment of “not more than five days.” 143 Ms. Smith “shall
be committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons,”144 and
“[t]he “Bureau may designate any available penal or correctional
facility.” 145
An older law, 18 U.S.C. § 4083, provides that those “convicted of offenses against the United States or by courts-martial
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year may be confined in any United States penitentiary,” but “[a] sentence for an
offense punishable by imprisonment for one year or less shall not
be served in a penitentiary without the consent of the defendant.” 146 Accordingly, Ms. Smith cannot be incarcerated in a penitentiary without her consent.
The Bureau of Prisons operates several types of facilities,
including Federal Correctional Institutions, and more secure
penitentiaries like Leavenworth.147 All are called prisons,148 inmates are called “federal prisoners,” 149 and the Bureau of Prisons operates the “federal prison system.” 150 However, the courts,
thus far, have interpreted § 4083 literally; it gives people convicted of low-level offenses the right not to be sent to penitentiaries, but offers no protection against commitment to prisons
or other institutions with names other than penitentiary.151

753 (9th Cir. 1919) (distinguishing imprisonment in prison or penitentiary from
jail sentence); Low v. United States, 169 F. 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1909) (under federal
law, “any sentence for a period longer than one year may be executed in a penitentiary, in place of a jail, workhouse, bridewell, or other place of confinement
deemed less degrading”).
143. 18 U.S.C. § 3581(b)(9) (2012).
144. Id. § 3621(a).
145. Id. § 3621(b).
146. Id. § 4083.
147. 28 C.F.R. § 500.1(d) (2000) (listing types of federal prisons).
148. Our Locations, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/
locations/list.jsp (last visited March 6, 2018) (see “Locations” and “Prisons” under facility types tab).
149. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63 (2001).
150. Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 486 (1981).
151. See United States v. Washington, 101 F. App’x 873, 876 (3d Cir. 2004)
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Using the literal approach heretofore applied by federal
courts, the Attorney General could permissibly assign Ms.
Smith, sentenced to five days for a federal infraction, to a prison.
Also, instead of calling Leavenworth a penitentiary, it could be
renamed a prison. Then it might become permissible to confine
Ms. Smith there without her consent, because it would no longer
be a penitentiary. It cannot be that the Framers of the Fifth
Amendment intended the Grand Jury Clause to be so easily
evaded.
A more realistic, functional approach would inquire whether
federal prisons and penitentiaries are constitutionally distinct
from state prisons and penitentiaries in the stigma they impose.
It is highly doubtful that alumni of federal prisons are, somehow,
more esteemed than former state prisoners. 152 Therefore, a potential sentence to federal prison is just as stigmatizing as a potential sentence to state prison. If so, all federal offenses with
the possibility of incarceration are infamous, and no one may be
convicted of even the most trivial federal crime in the absence of
a grand jury indictment.
This problem could be solved by Congress amending § 4083
so that those convicted only of misdemeanors may not be confined to either a prison or a penitentiary without their consent.
(“A crime is not infamous if it is not punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary . . . and, under 18 U.S.C. § 4083, no one may be imprisoned in a penitentiary unless their offense is punishable by more than a year in prison.”); United
States v. Colt, 126 F.3d 981, 986 (7th Cir. 1997) (“ To be entitled to a grand jury,
therefore, Colt needed to be subject to imprisonment in a penitentiary. Colt,
however, was never at risk of going to the penitentiary. As noted above,
18 U.S.C. § 4083 authorizes penitentiary imprisonment only for offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year.”); United States v. Emily, No. 911337, 1991 WL 240131 at *1 (10th Cir. Nov. 14, 1991) (per curiam) (“ This facility is a Federal Correctional Institution, not a penitentiary . . . . Sentencing
[misdemeanant serving a six month sentence] to this institution does not violate
the statute.”); United States v. Hanyard, 762 F.2d 1226, 1228 (5th Cir. 1985)
(“[A]ppellant admits that he is presently confined in the minimum security federal prison camp at Big Spring, Texas. Therefore, appellant is not confined in a
United States penitentiary within the meaning of section 4083, but in a distinct
type of institution, a federal prison camp.”); United States v. Moss, 604 F.2d
569, 572 (8th Cir. 1979) (“If punished as a principal under § 7205, Freeman
could not be imprisoned for more than one year. Because he could not therefore
be required to serve his sentence in a penitentiary without his consent his crime
cannot be deemed infamous and an indictment was not required.”); United
States v. Campbell, No. 3:06-CR-038, 2006 WL 2548732, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug.
31, 2006) (“Defendant is incarcerated in a federal correctional institution, not a
federal penitentiary and 18 U.S.C. § 4083 therefore does not apply to his case.”).
152. Cf. United States v. Rutledge, 33 F.3d 671, 672 (6th Cir. 1994) (explaining properly, in response to the defense’s argument, why the government made
“a federal case out of ” the incident).
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Alternatively, the courts holding that the statute is inapplicable
to prisons could overrule those decisions. Until then, though, all
federal offenses providing for the possibility of incarceration are
infamous and can only be charged by indictment.
2. Loss of Civil Status

An offense resulting in loss of civil rights is infamous.
Thomas Cooley wrote: “[a]n infamous offence is one involving
moral turpitude in the offender, or infamy in the punishment, or
both . . . [and includes] any punishment that involves the loss of
civil or political privileges.” 153 Similarly, in a criminal law treatise cited by the Supreme Court, 154 one scholar explained:
[c]orporal punishments, immediately affecting the body, and publickly
[sic] inflicted, ought to be infamous in the estimation of the people; so
should degradations from titles of honor, civil incapacities, brandings,
and public exhibitions of the offender: all which penalties should be
applied with great caution, and only to offenses infamous in their nature. 155

Using a double negative, the Supreme Court determined
that ineligibility to hold office rendered a crime infamous. In Ex
parte Wilson, the Court stated: “We are not indeed disposed to
deny that a crime, to the conviction and punishment of which
Congress has superadded a disqualification to hold office, is
thereby made infamous.” 156 The North Carolina Supreme Court
similarly observed:
[T]he disqualification to hold office is certainly a punishment that implies disgrace and infamy. It fixes upon the convicted party a stigma of
disgrace and reproach in the eyes of honest and honorable men that
continues for life. It is difficult to conceive of a punishment more galling
and degrading in this country than disqualification to hold office,
whether one be an office seeker or not. Here, generally, all honest men
are eligible to office, to share in the honors and emoluments incident to
it. How great the standing disgrace that one cannot, because of crime

153. THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 291 (1880); see also JAMES PARKER
HALL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 106 (1915) (“Imprisonment in a state prison or
penitentiary is an infamous punishment, also deprivation of ordinary civil or
political privileges.”).
154. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 422 (1885).
155. WILLIAM EDEN AUCKLAND, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW 51–52 (1771).
156. Wilson, 114 U.S. at 426 (citing United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76,
82 (1884)) (noting but not deciding the question); see also, e.g., Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 135 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(“Some functions performed by a Judicial Council may be ‘administrative.’ But
where, as here, it moves to disqualify a judge from sitting, removing him pro
tanto from office, it moves against the individual with all of the sting and much
of the stigma that impeachment carries.”).
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that imputes corruption in office! 157

The constitutional text itself suggests that misdemeanors
resulting in loss of office require grand jury indictment. The Constitution provides that “[t]he President, Vice President and all
Civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office
on Impeachment for and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” 158 While punishment
“shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or
Profit under the United States,” the Constitution provides that
“the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to
Law.” 159 Accordingly, the Constitution suggests that any misdemeanor serious enough to warrant removal from office can only
be prosecuted by grand jury indictment.
As office-holders themselves, judges might be particularly
sensitive to denial of the right to hold office, but the loss of other
rights is also serious. The Court has recognized that conviction
of an infamous crime is associated with the loss of voting
rights; 160 the ability to serve on a jury; 161 or to hold a fiduciary
appointment. 162 A District of Columbia judge explained: “To
make that penalty infamous, it must pronounce against the offender a degradation from his civil rights as a citizen, the right
of franchise, the right of giving testimony, or some other civil or
157. Harris v. Terry, 3 S.E. 745, 746 (N.C. 1887). Of course, the court here
interpreted its own law, not the U.S. Constitution, but its discussion is relevant
to the question of stigma.
158. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 4.
159. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
160. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 983 (1991) (“ The disenfranchisement of a citizen,’ [the judge] said, ‘is not an unusual punishment; it was the
consequence of treason, and of infamous crimes, and it was altogether discretionary in the legislature to extend that punishment to other offences.” (quoting
Barker v. People, 20 Johns. 457, 459 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823), aff ’d, 3 Cow. 686 (N.Y.
1824))).
161. United States v. Gale, 109 U.S. 65, 67 (1883) (“It is perfectly clear that
all persons serving upon the grand jury must be good and lawful men; by which
it is intended, that they [among other things must not be] attainted of any treason or felony; or convicted of any species of crimen falsi, as conspiracy or perjury,
which may render them infamous.”); cf. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991)
(“Indeed, with the exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege
of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic
process.”).
162. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Tisdale, 91 U.S. 238, 243 (1875) (“ Thus
persons convicted of infamous crime are excluded from this office, and persons
of notoriously evil lives may be passed by in the discretion of the Probate
Court.”).
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political right existing in the privileges of citizenship.” 163 Other
federal 164 and state 165 cases recognize that the loss of civil rights
or privileges are consequences of a criminal charge that make it
infamous.
Having rights equal to others in the community is an important aspect of dignified membership. A clear form of stigma
is a legal sanction imposed by the government on the ground that
one is dangerous, degraded, impaired or unqualified. 166 The Supreme Court has long recognized that deprivation of rights based
163. United States v. Cross, No. 8709, 1873 WL 15854, at *4 (D.C. Sept.
1873).
164. United States v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 637 F.2d 1248, 1253–54 (9th
Cir. 1980) (“ The possibility of imprisonment in a penitentiary is only one index
of whether a crime is infamous. . . . In addition, crimes punishable at common
law by civil disabilities were deemed infamous. The indictment clauses of several state constitutions are interpreted to require indictment for such crimes,
and at least one federal court has suggested that such crimes are infamous
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.”); United States v. Field, 16 F.
778, 782 (C.C.D. Vt. 1883) (“‘But the punishment of the penitentiary must always be deemed infamous; and so must any punishment that involves the loss
of civil or political privileges.’ Cooley, Const. Law, 29.”); United States v. Butler,
25 F. Cas. 226, 226 (C.C.D.S.C. 1876) (“But in looking through that chapter
there is no crime mentioned which can be thought infamous unless it be the one
described in section 5508, under which this information is filed; for which the
party convicted is not only to be fined and imprisoned but also to be disqualified
ever thereafter from holding any place of trust and profit or honor under the
laws of the United States, and is rendered ineligible to office.”).
165. People ex rel. Akin v. Kipley, 49 N.E. 229, 239 (Ill. 1897) (citing Ex parte
Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885)) (“A crime which subjects the party to a disqualification to hold office in case he is convicted of such crime is an infamous crime.
Disqualification from holding office, if inflicted as a punishment for crime, is an
infamous punishment.”); Burke v. Stewart, 1898 WL 3061, at *2 (Ill. App. Ct.
Dec. 1898) (“that the conviction of ‘any crime’ meant by the statute was the conviction of such a crime as at common law worked a disability to testify, that is
to say, conviction of an infamous offense”); State v. Clark, 56 P. 767, 770 (Kan.
1899) (“it was not intended that anything short of infamous punishment should
take away the civil rights of the convict, or incapacitate him as a witness”); King
v. City of Pineville, 299 S.W. 1082, 1084 (Ky. 1927) (“infliction of a punishment
of deprivation of suffrage degrades the offender ”); State v. Bussay, 96 A. 337,
339 (R.I. 1916) (“Is the offense charged in this complaint an infamous crime?
We think not. A crime to be thus characterized must come within the crimen
falsi, such as forgery, perjury, subornation of perjury; that is, offenses affecting
the public administration of justice, or such as would affect civil or political
rights, disqualifying or rendering a person incompetent to be a witness or a juror.”); Cole v. Campbell, 968 S.W.2d 274, 275–76 (Tenn. 1998) (“Virtually every
jurisdiction subjects a convicted defendant not only to criminal punishment but
also sanctions that restrict civil and proprietary rights. . . . Such restrictions, or
civil disabilities, date back to ancient Greece and Rome, when a criminal conviction rendered one infamous, and resulted in the loss of the right to vote, hold
office, make speeches or assemble.” (internal citation omitted)).
166. A related principle allows a suit against the government for defamation
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on status imposes the most serious sort of stigma. 167 Thus, in
Strauder v. West Virginia, 168 the Court held that it was unconstitutional to exclude African Americans from jury service in
part because of the stigma of legal inequality:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied
by a statute all right to participate in the administration of the law, as
jurors, because of their color, though they are citizens, and may be in
other respects fully qualified, is practically a brand upon them, affixed
by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race
prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race
that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others. 169

The Court has also recognized that denial of the right to

resulting in some tangible harm:
This circuit, in turn, has consistently interpreted [the] “stigma plus”
test [of Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)] to require two forms of government action before a plaintiff can “transform a [common law] defamation into a [constitutional] deprivation of liberty.” Mosrie v. Barry,
718 F.2d 1151, 1161–62 (D.C. Cir. 1983). First, the government must
be the source of the defamatory allegations. See id. at 1161. Second, the
resulting “stigma” must involve some tangible change of status vis-avis the government. As the Mosrie court explained: [T]he principal recent cases from this court in which a government-imposed stigma was
found to have deprived the stigmatized person of a liberty interest involved either loss of employment or foreclosure of a right to be considered for government contracts in common with all other persons. Id. at
1161 (emphasis added).
Doe v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1108–09 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
167. Stevenson’s Heirs v. Sullivant, 18 U.S. 207, 263 n.a (1820) (noting that
under Roman law, “[n]one of these different classes of illegitimate offspring
were stigmatized by civil degradation, or excluded from aspiring to public honours”).
168. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), abrogated on other
grounds, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
169. Id. at 308. More recently, the Court explained:
[I]n upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42
U.S.C. § 2000a, which forbids race discrimination in public accommodations, we emphasized that its “fundamental object . . . was to vindicate ‘the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments.’” Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964). That stigmatizing injury, and the denial of equal opportunities that accompanies it, is
surely felt as strongly by persons suffering discrimination on the basis
of their sex as by those treated differently because of their race.
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984); see also, e.g., Tennessee v.
Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 536 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“ The Americans with
Disabilities Act . . . is a measure expected to advance equal-citizenship stature
for persons with disabilities.”); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma,
and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 471 (2000) (ADA aims both to “guarante[e]
a baseline of equal citizenship by protecting against stigma and systematic exclusion from public and private opportunities, and [to] protec[t] society against
the loss of valuable talents”).
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marry, as well as the termination of parental rights, is stigmatizing.170 It is clear that the special harm is the injury coupled
with an insult. For example, the Court found that the Constitution imposed special procedural restrictions in connection with
claims of parental incompetence: “Victory by the State not only
makes termination of parental rights possible; it entails a judicial determination that the parents are unfit to raise their own
children.” 171 Further, many courts have recognized that the loss
of otherwise available firearms rights is potentially stigmatizing
in addition to its restriction on conduct.172
Any consequence of conviction of a misdemeanor resulting
in loss of equal civil status should require indictment. This includes loss of the right to hold office; to vote; to possess firearms;
or to serve on a jury.
While there are arguably others, three specific classes of
misdemeanors are infamous because of their association with
the loss of key civil rights. First, by federal statute, all drug offenses carry with them the possibility of being sentenced to ineligibility for federal benefits. 173 This is a stigmatizing loss of

170. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (“[L]aws excluding same-sex couples from the marriage right impose stigma and injury of the
kind prohibited by our basic charter . ”); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675, 2693 (2013) (“ The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in
question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon
all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”).
171. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982).
172. In re Joan K., 273 P.3d 594, 597 (Alaska 2012) (“Joan notes that several
other courts have applied the collateral consequences exception to mootness in
the involuntary commitment context. She points to social stigma, adverse employment restrictions, application in future legal proceedings, and restrictions
on the right to possess firearms as recognized consequences from involuntary
commitment orders.”); Ritchie v. Konrad, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 387, 393 (Ct. App.
2004) (“a protective order imposes costs and penalties on the restrained party—
the stigma (which may have practical consequences for employment and elsewhere in life) and, for those with reasons to own or use firearms in their profession or for protection or just for sport, there is the automatic firearm relinquishment requirement . . . .”); Monzingo v. Garden Grove, 190 Cal. Rptr. 750, 753
(Ct. App. 1983) (“On the other hand, the denial of the statutory privilege of a
retired officer to carry a concealed firearm for his own protection, particularly
when it is based on certain medical reports, carries a stigma of mental instability which could cause serious damage to one’s reputation and acceptance in the
community.”); People v. Holt, 998 N.E.2d 933, 935 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (“Beyond
the stigma attached to the finding and treatment order, defendant could suffer
adverse legal consequences including, for instance, limitations on her right to
own firearms . . . .”), aff ’d, 21 N.E.3d 695 (Ill. 2014).
173. Section 862(b) provides:
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equal status.
Second, sex offenses requiring registration are infamous. It
is hard to imagine a more stigmatizing offense than one requiring registration and public disclosure. Misdemeanor offenses can
sometimes require registration. 174 Professor Catherine Carpenter explained:
[T]hese laws also serve to name, brand, and stigmatize those convicted
of sexual offenses, a stigma that attaches and follows the offender for
years, no matter the inconsequential nature of the underlying offense.
Steeped in historical tradition, public humiliation serves as an important tool for a community to expend its disapprobation for a
crime. 175

Third, deportation based on criminal conviction is insulting
as well as injurious, making it akin to the other infamous punishments. The Supreme Court has recognized “the stigma of deportation,” 176 as have other courts.177 One scholar wrote that
“[w]hile deportation is not technically considered punishment, it
is clearly understood as a shame-inducing punishment by deportees, their families, and the communities from which they originate.” 178 Any offense serious enough to warrant deportation
(1) Any individual who is convicted of any Federal or State offense involving the possession of a controlled substance (as such term is defined
for purposes of this subchapter) shall—
(A) upon the first conviction for such an offense and at the discretion of the court—
(i) be ineligible for any or all Federal benefits for up to one year;
(ii) be required to successfully complete an approved drug treatment program which includes periodic testing to insure that the individual remains drug free;
(iii) be required to perform appropriate community service; or
(iv) any combination of clause (i), (ii), or (iii) . . . .
21 U.S.C. § 862(b)(1)(A)(i)–(iv) (2012).
174. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
175. Catherine L. Carpenter, The Constitutionality of Strict Liability in Sex
Offender Registration Laws, 86 B.U. L. REV. 295, 299 (2006) (internal citations
omitted); see also, e.g., State v. Trotter, 330 P.3d 1267, 1273 (Utah 2014) (“[W]e
begin by acknowledging the serious social stigmas that attach to one who must
register as a sex offender.”).
176. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 26 (1982).
177. See also, e.g., Yam Sang Kwai v. INS, 411 F.2d 683, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(Skelly Wright, J., dissenting) (“[D]eportation [is] a sanction often indistinguishable from criminal punishment in the shame and distress it brings upon
those subjected to it.”); Ex parte Bun Chew, 220 F. 387, 389 (S.D. Cal. 1915)
(“ This petitioner herein should be awarded his liberty, and absolved, not only
from the stigma placed upon him, but also from the unjust interference with his
freedom of action.”).
178. Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, Visa as Property, Visa as Collateral,
64 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1070 n.63 (2011) (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Eunice
Hyunhye Cho, Giselle A. Hass & Leticia M. Saucedo, A New Understanding of
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should be charged by indictment.
3. Misdemeanors of Crimen Falsi and Moral Turpitude

The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that a person may be
impeached based on conviction of certain misdemeanors.179 The
inability to testify or to testify without impeachment based on
conviction of a crime 180 represents both the loss of a civil right 181
and a stigmatizing mark of shame. 182 Conviction of a crime of
moral turpitude or a crime classified as crimen falsi 183 reduces a
Substantial Abuse: Evaluating Harm in U Visa Petitions for Immigrant Victims
of Workplace Crime, 29 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 23 (2014) (“In many cases, fear of
deportation is a significant obstacle to coping with workplace abuse, as deportation would generate significant shame and hardship to a worker and his or
her family, invoking a stigma of failure, and making it more difficult to seek
employment and rebuild a life back in the worker ’s home country.”
179. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2) (“For any crime regardless of the punishment,
the evidence must be admitted if the court can readily determine that establishing the elements of the crime required proving—or the witness’s admitting—a
dishonest act or false statement.”).
180. There has long been debate about whether impairment of testimonial
rights is punishment. Compare Evidence—Witnesses: Incompetency by Infamy—
Power of Legislature to Declare Previously Convicted Persons Competent,
42 HARV. L. REV. 957, 958 (1929) (“ The disqualification of witnesses for infamy
is not properly a punishment, but merely a refusal to hear those supposed to
have no regard for truth.”), with John MacArthur Maguire & Charles S. S. Epstein, Rules of Evidence in Preliminary Controversies As to Admissibility,
36 YALE L.J. 1101, 1101 n.5 (1927) (“Disqualification visited upon a would-be
witness because of infamy involved a punitive element, added to the notion that
as an infamous person he was unworthy of belief.”).
181. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012) (“All persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property
as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.”).
182. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 511–12 (1989) (“As the
law evolved, this absolute bar gradually was replaced by a rule that allowed
such witnesses to testify in both civil and criminal cases, but also to be impeached by evidence of a prior felony conviction or a crimen falsi misdemeanor
conviction.”). As one court explained:
The fact that a statute may classify his acts as grand and petit larceny,
and not punish the latter with imprisonment and declare it to be only
a misdemeanor, does not destroy the fact that theft, whether it be
grand or petit larceny involves moral turpitude. It is malum in se, and
so the consensus of opinion—statute or no statute—deduces from the
commission of crimes malum in se the conclusion that the perpetrator
is depraved in mind and is without moral character, because, forsooth,
his very act involves moral turpitude.
Bartos v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Neb., 19 F.2d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 1927).
183. Crimen falsi are offenses “pertaining to dishonesty,” Green, 490 U.S. at
507, including “forgery, perjury, the alteration of the current coin, dealing with
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person’s rights as a witness because it constitutes evidence of
bad character. 184 And a crime need not be a felony to be used for
impeachment. 185 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has recog-

false weights and measures, etc.” Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 466 (1888).
184. E.g., Dixon v. McMullen, 527 F. Supp. 711, 718 (N.D. Tex.1981) (holding
that a pardon “may remove some disabilities, but does not change the commonlaw principle that a conviction of an infamous offense is evidence of bad character”).
185. See, e.g., United States v. Saitta, 443 F.2d 830, 831 (5th Cir. 1971) (“ The
law is clear in this circuit that any witness, including a defendant who elects to
testify, can be discredited by a showing of prior felony convictions or misdemeanor convictions involving moral turpitude.”); Christianson v. United States,
226 F.2d 646, 655 (8th Cir. 1955) (“Evidence of the conviction of crime as affecting the credibility of a witness is limited to conviction of a felony, an infamous
crime, or a crime involving moral turpitude.”); Simon v. United States, 123 F.2d
80, 86 (4th Cir. 1941) (“In criminal cases a witness may be asked, for purposes
of impeachment, whether he has been convicted of a felony, infamous crime,
petit larceny, or a crime involving moral turpitude.”); Coulston v. United States,
51 F.2d 178, 182 (10th Cir. 1931) (“In criminal cases a witness may be asked,
for purposes of impeachment, whether he has been convicted of a felony, infamous crime, petit larceny, or a crime involving moral turpitude . . . .”).
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nized that infringement of testimonial capacity is a characteristic of infamous crimes,186 as have other federal 187 and state
courts 188 and scholars.189
186. United States v. Ford, 99 U.S. 594, 595 (1878) (“Accomplices in guilt,
not previously convicted of an infamous crime, when separately tried are competent witnesses for or against each other . . . .”).
187. See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 281 (3d Cir. 1976) (“ The
term crimen falsi has roots in the common law doctrine that persons convicted
of certain kinds of crimes were disqualified from testifying.”); Campbell v.
United States, 176 F.2d 45, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (“At common law, a witness could
be asked, for impeachment purposes, whether he had ever been convicted of a
crime only if the conviction had been for an infamous crime involving moral
turpitude.”); Solomon v. United States, 297 F. 82, 92–93 (1st Cir. 1924) (“In
Greenleaf ’s Evidence, vol. 1, §§ 372 and 373, the author, in speaking of the common-law rule of the disqualification of a witness, says that its basis seems to be
that ‘infamous persons—i.e., persons convicted of heinous offenses—[are] morally too corrupt to be trusted to testify; so reckless of the distinction between
truth and falsehood and insensible to the restraining force of an oath as to render it extremely improbable that . . . [they] will speak the truth at all;’ that ‘the
usual and more general enumeration [of crimes that will render the perpetrator
thus infamous] is, treason, felony and the crimen falsi.” (alterations in original)); Pollard v. United States, 261 F. 336, 338 (5th Cir. 1919) (“ The offense was
not one involving moral turpitude, nor was it a crimen falsi, and it was not punishable by a penitentiary or hard labor sentence, and so was not an infamous
crime, which was triable, under the Constitution, only by indictment.”); United
States v. Smith, 40 F. 755, 758 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1889) (“ This is not strictly so, for
all these courts had held that in addition to the crimen falsi those crimes of
every grade which the statutes declared to be felonies were infamous, and
should be prosecuted on indictments.”); United States v. Maxwell, 26 F. Cas.
1221, 1222 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1875) (“ The words ‘infamous crime,’ have a fixed and
settled meaning. In a legal sense they are descriptive of an offense that subjects
a person to infamous punishment or prevents his being a witness.”); id. at 1223
(“minor offenses . . . involving no moral turpitude” may be prosecuted by information).
188. See, e.g., State v. Hatch, 239 P.3d 432, 434 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (“Like
its federal counterpart, [Ariz. R. Evid.] Rule 609(a) traces its origins to the common law’s total prohibition on the testimony of those previously convicted of
‘crimes of infamy’: treason, felonies, and crimen falsi.”); State v. Oldner, 206
S.W.3d 818, 824 (Ark. 2005) (“ Thus, for the purposes of a rule permitting impeachment of a witness on the basis of his or her conviction of an ‘infamous
crime,’ the term has been deemed to include treason, crimes that were commonlaw felonies, and other ‘crimen falsi’ . . . .” (citation omitted)); Kurtz v. Farrington, 132 A. 540, 542 (Conn. 1926) (“ Treason, felony, and the crimen falsi, as at
common law, including all crimes for which the punishment prescribed must be
imprisonment in the state prison, are infamous crimes, and this term includes,
in addition, all crimes or misdemeanors which in their nature involve moral
turpitude, and must be punished by imprisonment in jail for a term which may
be six months or more.”); Dorcy v. City of Dover Bd. of Elections, No. CIV. A.
93C-12-31, 1994 WL 146012, at *5 (Del. Super. Mar. 25, 1994) (“A traditional
and long-standing definition of infamous crime is that it includes crimen falsi
. . . .”), aff ’d, 642 A.2d 836 (Del. 1994); People v. Spates, 395 N.E.2d 563, 567
(Ill. 1979) (“Crimen falsi is a class of offenses, misdemeanors at common law,
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Additionally, there is no apparent jurisprudential movement against the idea that it is stigmatizing to brand a person a
liar and of bad character. Under modern federal evidence law,
those convicted of crimes of moral turpitude are no longer incompetent to testify as witnesses, but their rights are systematically
impaired. Their ability to assert and enforce their rights is subject to the reality that their testimony as witnesses is automatically discredited.190
which, along with treason and any felony, comprise the infamous crimes.” (citation omitted)); Tucker v. Lower, 434 P.2d 320, 324 (Kan. 1967) (“Infamous
crimes are treason, felony and the crimen falsi.”); Wicks v. State, 535 A.2d 459,
461 (Md. 1988) (“Infamous crimes at common law also included the crimen
falsi.”); State v. Bussay, 96 A. 337, 339 (R.I. 1916) (“Is the offense charged in
this complaint an infamous crime? We think not. A crime to be thus characterized must come within the crimen falsi, such as forgery, perjury, subornation of
perjury; that is, offenses affecting the public administration of justice, or such
as would affect civil or political rights, disqualifying or rendering a person incompetent to be a witness or a juror.”); State v. Jeffcoat, 146 S.E. 95, 96 (S.C.
1928) (“ The rule of the common law was that a person was incompetent as a
witness if he had been convicted of an infamous crime, such as treason, felony,
or any of the crimen falsi, but a mere conviction of crime did not disqualify if
the offender had not been thereby rendered infamous.” (citation omitted)); Bell
v. Commonwealth, 189 S.E. 441, 443 (Va. 1937) (“At common law, persons convicted in courts of record of crimes which render them infamous are excluded
from being witnesses. ‘Infamous’ crime in this sense is regarded as comprehending, treason, felony, and crimen falsi.” (citation omitted)); State v. Bezemer, 14
P.2d 460, 464 (Wash. 1932) (“Infamous crimes included treason, felony, any offense that tended to pervert the administration of justice, and those that fell
within the term ‘crimen falsi’ at the Roman law.” (citation omitted)).
189. 2 BARBARA E. BERGMAN & NANCY HOLLANDER, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE § 7:6 (15th ed. 1998) (“At common law, a person convicted in a court
of record of a crime that rendered him ‘infamous’ was incompetent to be a witness. Infamous crime, in the sense intended, included treason, felony, and
crimen falsi.”); 22 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM: CRIMINAL LAW § 6 (2006) (“An ‘infamous’ crime, in this sense, is regarded as comprehending treason, felony, and
crimen falsi.”); 21 THOMSON REUTERS, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 129 (2d ed.
2016) (“[ F ]or the purposes of a rule permitting impeachment of a witness on the
basis of [his or her] conviction of an ‘infamous crime,’ the term has been deemed
to include treason, crimes that were common-law felonies, and other ‘crimen
falsi’ . . . .”); 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 22 (15th ed.
1993) (“At common law, a person convicted of a crime which rendered him infamous was thereby made incompetent as a witness. An ‘infamous’ crime included
treason, felony, and crimen falsi.”); 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON
THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 651 (1904) (“ The usual
and more general enumeration is, treason, felony, and the crimen falsi.”); Brian
C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65, 153
n.396 (2003) (“‘Infamous crimes’ probably comprise common-law felonies, treason, and crimen falsi such as perjury, embezzlement, theft, and fraud.”); Note,
Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude, 43 HARV. L. REV. 117, 118 (1929) (“The
classifications in vogue included felony and misdemeanor, crimes mala in se and
mala prohibita, crimen falsi, and infamous crimes.”).
190. See Gabriel J. Chin, “A Chinaman’s Chance” in Court: Asian Pacific
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[A]s an attorney explained in one Kentucky case, acts involving moral
turpitude were set apart by the permanent harm they could inflict upon
reputation. “We estimate the character of a man by the uniform tenor
of his life,” the attorney reasoned, and “there are particular acts of
moral turpitude, the commission of which, would be decisive of his infamy, and stamp an indelible stigma on his reputation . . . .” 191

CONCLUSION
Many more federal misdemeanors should be charged by indictment. Notably, many misdemeanors are infamous because
they authorize imprisonment or carry stigmatizing consequences. Congress has the ability to change their status by eliminating the statutory collateral consequences associated with
them—rendering them noninfamous. Given that Congress has
elected to attach serious consequences to misdemeanor convictions, 192 it is hardly unfair or unreasonable that the procedures
associated with serious crimes, including a grand jury indictment, should equally apply to misdemeanor offenses.
Admittedly, increased use of the grand jury is a limited response to the problems of the U.S. criminal-justice system. More
direct remedies might include criminalizing less conduct and
providing more opportunities for precharge diversion, 193 allowing defendants to avoid charges altogether. These and other reforms are well worth considering. But requiring grand jury indictments for more misdemeanors has the advantage of being
based on the text of the Constitution and existing Supreme
Court precedent. Accordingly, although resorting to the grand
jury is a second- or third-best solution, it has the virtue of being
a remedy at hand.
It is true that the grand jury usually indicts. But it is also
true that the federal nonconviction rate for misdemeanors is approximately five times higher than it is for felonies. Misdemeanors can be profoundly stigmatizing, yet are much more likely to

Americans and Racial Rules of Evidence, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 965, 969 (2013)
(discussing People v. Jones, 31 Cal. 566, 574 (1867)).
191. Julia Ann Simon-Kerr, Moral Turpitude, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1001, 1015
(2012) (quoting Johnson v. Moore’s Heirs, 11 Ky. 371, 380 (1822)); see also id. at
1012 (“ This developing American ethos that demanded integrity, hard work,
and loyalty in male citizens meant that deception, disloyalty, and the failure to
contribute productively to society were the primary traits condemned as moral
turpitude in men.”).
192. See supra Part I.
193. See Mary Fan, Street Diversion and Decarceration, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
165, 195 (2013).
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be charged without careful consideration. If the federal authorities used grand juries to carefully investigate and evaluate minor charges, and charged only those misdemeanors that they believed should and could result in a conviction, thousands of
offenses would likely drop off the criminal records of Americans. 194 This is the right outcome because the Constitution contemplated that these prosecutions never should have been instituted. 195

194. See supra Part II.A.
195. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

